1-09. 국가인권기구에 대한 정치 대표
1-9. Political Representatives on NHRIs
채택일 2018. 2. 21.
G.O. 1.9 Political representatives on NHRIs
The SCA notes that the Paris Principles require an NHRI to be independent from government in its structure, composition, decision-making and method of operation. It must be constituted and empowered to consider and determine the strategic priorities and activities of the NHRI based solely on its determination of the human rights priorities in the country, free from political interference.
For these reasons, government representatives and members of parliament should not be members of, nor participate in, the decision-making of organs of an NHRI. Their membership of, and participation in, the decision-making body of the NHRI has the potential to impact on both the real and perceived independence of the NHRI.
The SCA recognizes that it is important to maintain effective working relationships, and where relevant, to consult with government. However, this should not be achieved through the participation of government representatives in the decision-making body of the NHRI.
Where government representatives or members of parliament, or representatives of government agencies, are included in the decision-making body, the NHRI’s legislation should clearly indicate that such persons participate only in an advisory capacity. In order to further promote independence in decision making, and avoid conflicts of interest, an NHRI’s rules of procedure should establish practices to ensure that such persons are unable to inappropriately influence decision-making by, for example, excluding them from attending parts of meetings where final deliberations and strategic decisions are made.
The participation of government representatives or members of parliament, or representatives of government agencies, should be restricted to those whose roles and functions are of direct relevance to the mandate and functions of the NHRI, and whose advice and cooperation may assist the NHRI in fulfilling its mandate. In addition, the number of such representatives should be limited and should not exceed the number of other members of the NHRI’s governing body.
JUSTIFICATION
Paris Principle C(a) states that an NHRI must be able to “freely consider any question falling within its competence”.
Paris Principle B.2 states that the requirement of an appropriate infrastructure is intended to ensure the NHRI is “independent of the government”.
Paris Principle B.3 requires that members of an NHRI are appointed officially, thereby promoting a stable mandate “without which there can be no real independence”.
Paris Principles B.1 specifically provides that representatives of government departments can participate “only in an advisory capacity”.
By clearly promoting independence in the composition, structure and method of operation of an NHRI, these provisions seek to avoid any possible interference in the NHRI’s assessment of the human rights situation in the State and the subsequent determination of its strategic priorities. It follows therefore that members of parliament, and especially those who are members of the ruling political party or coalition, or representatives of government agencies, should not in general be represented on, nor should they participate in decision making, since they hold positions that may at times conflict with an independent NHRI.
The SCA acknowledges the value in developing and maintaining effective links with relevant ministers and government agencies, particularly where cooperation will assist in promoting the NHRI’s mandate. However, it stresses that this must be done in a way that ensures both real and perceived independence of decision making and operation, and avoids a conflict of interest. The creation of Advisory Committees is an example of a mechanism where such relationships can be maintained without impacting on the NHRI’s independence.
The SCA notes that Paris Principle B.1 specifically states that representatives of government agencies have only an advisory role, while no such restriction is explicitly stated in relation to representatives of parliament. It notes, however, that in providing an indicative list of relevant stakeholders, Paris Principle B.1 envisages either the “presence” or the ability to establish “effective cooperation” with such representatives. Given the explicit requirements for independence stated throughout the Paris Principles, examples of which are referenced above, the SCA is of the view that a similar restriction must apply to members of parliament, and particularly those who are members of the ruling political party or coalition.
참고 정보 링크 서비스
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